The semiconductor industry has a rich experience with the offshoring of manufacturing activity. Semiconductor (or chip) companies were among the first to invest in offshore facilities to manufacture goods for import back to the U.S.
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Introduction: The Semiconductor Industry
In order to understand the offshoring of activities in the semiconductor industry, we begin by describing the stages of production.
The most important type of semiconductor, and the one on which this study is focused, is the integrated circuit, or "chip," which is basically a network of tiny wires fabricated on a surface connecting transistors that switch on and off for processing data in binary code. 1 The development and manufacturing of chips involve three primary activities in the value chain: design, fabrication, test and assembly. The semiconductor industry has successively undergone the offshoring of each of these activities-first assembly, then fabrication, and now design.
During design, the desired electronic circuits progress through a series of abstract representations of increasing detail. During fabrication, the circuits of the chips are built up on the surface of a flat, round silicon wafer in successive layers Assembly is, typically, the process of cutting the wafer into individual chips (or die), which can number in the thousands, depending on die size, and packaging the delicate chip in a protective shell that includes connections to other components.
The economic characteristics of each step of the process differ significantly.
Design is skill intensive, and requires expensive EDA (electronic design automation) software, which is typically licensed per design engineer. Fabrication requires a huge fixed investment (currently on the order of $2 billion) to build a plant (called a fab) that holds a wide variety of expensive equipment and that meets extreme requirements of cleanliness. Assembly also requires expensive equipment, but the overall costs of plant and equipment are much lower than for the fab, as are the average skill requirements.
Overall, worker skill requirements go down along the value chain (i.e., design is more skill-intensive than manufacturing, which is more skill-intensive than assembly).
However, equipment costs dominate labor costs, especially for fabrication, and this has limited the attractiveness of low-cost labor locations. Even the most labor-intensive activity, chip assembly, has become more automated over time. As discussed below, other costs, including those relating to land, taxes, and government regulations, often affect decisions to invest offshore.
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In the longer term, numerous firm-level investments in a foreign location may transform the location in such a way that it presents a new set of opportunities that lead to a transformation of the industry. A foreign location that is initially little more than a source of lower costs, especially labor, might develop over time as a specialized supply base, particularly in the presence of incentives and infrastructure provided by the host country government. The changes can increase the value of the location to the point that the industry eventually restructures around the new distribution of skills such that offshoring becomes the preferred mode for this part of the value chain. It will be discussed below how this occurred for semiconductor assembly, but it has also taken place in other industries, such as hard disk drives. 2 In other words, the pursuit of offshoring to gain competitive advantage in the context of a growing market initiates a dynamic process that has implications for both host and investing countries. The current fear of loss of industry leadership is based on the continual escalation of fabrication and design costs combined with competition for the global labor supply of engineers, which may provide the fast-growing and lower-cost nations of China and India a chance to catch up, and pass, the U.S., especially as Asian markets provide a large part of the growth in global chip demand. Observers also fear loss of U.S.
leadership in innovation, since private firms, faced with the low return and high risk on investment and the looming technological challenges to staying on Moore's law, have become less willing and able to shoulder the continual need for large R&D expenditures.
One version of the current crisis is predicted loss of U.S. industry leadership as a result of R&D following manufacturing to China. We consider this a simplified variant of the current crisis. The fear that the U.S. will become less innovative and no longer be the leader in developing new technologies is based upon the assumption that research ITEC Working Paper 08-07
and development in leading-edge technology follows manufacturing abroad. In the semiconductor industry, we have not observed this occurring as foundries, especially in Taiwan, have taken over a growing proportion of chip manufacturing. As we discuss below, foundries provide leading-edge process technology, often in alliance with U.S.
industry leaders, as well as design services for customers. These activities have served as a complement to innovation activities for U.S. fabless startups as well as mature chip companies, which have been relying increasingly on contract fabrication abroad.
Sending activities abroad
The three primary reasons for locating value chain activities globally are 1)access to location-specific resources, especially engineering talent; 2) cost reduction; and 3) local market development and access. Often, the shift of an activity to a new location via internal investment or outsourcing is in response to all three reasons. For example, a company may move chip design to China in order to take advantage of engineering talent that is low cost and knowledgeable about customized solutions for the regional
Chinese telecommunication systems as well as to gain government approval for market access.
Offshore investments in chip fabrication historically were driven by market access concerns, particularly tariffs, more than by cost reduction because of the capitalintensive nature of chip manufacturing. This is reflected by the location of most U.S.-owned offshore fabs in developed countries such as Japan. In 2001, approximately onethird of U.S.-owned capacity was located offshore (see Table 1 ). Conversely, about 22% of the fab capacity located in North America was owned by companies based in other regions (not shown). Foreign companies still find the U.S. an attractive place to invest, as evidenced by Samsung's recent commitment to a new, multi-billion-dollar fab in Austin.
3 As is true of fabrication, design offshoring works both ways, and many foreign companies maintain a Silicon Valley or other U.S. design center to take advantage of the high skills and productivity available there as well as to be closer to U.S. customers.
Philips of the Netherlands, for example, bought VLSI Technology, a major ASIC company with over 2,000 employees (about one-third of whom were fab workers), in 1999 for nearly $1 billion. 5 Hitachi Semiconductor has a U.S. design group several hundred strong. 6 Toshiba has a network of seven ASIC design centers around the United States. 7 Even foreign start-ups may need to have a U.S. design team to work with U.S.
customers or to access leading-edge analog design skills.
However the reason for design offshoring that is perhaps getting the most attention is cost reduction. For Silicon Valley firms, some cost reduction is available by opening satellite design centers elsewhere in the U.S., where some locations have average engineering salaries that are up to 20% lower than those in the Silicon Valley. But these salaries are still much higher than salaries in India and elsewhere, as discussed below.
Cost-driven in-house offshoring incurs non-wage costs that partially offset the difference in salaries, especially during the early stages of establishing an offshore design center. One that is often mentioned is the lower quality and productivity of Data from the Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA) shows that U.S.
companies still have two-thirds of their engineers located in the U.S., and this
proportion may be displaying a recent downward trend (see Table 2 ). Although the data are not strictly comparable from year to year, they can be used to discuss general trends and confirm other data. We have observed some movement of design jobs over the business cycle. A wave of design offshoring took place at the height of the dot.com bubble. When the cascading effect of the subsequent downturn reached the semiconductor industry, chip companies cut staff at home. Now that the recovery requires expansion of design operations, chip companies appear to be expanding design operations abroad faster than at home. 10 It is too early to predict where this relative shift in the geographic distribution of employment will find a new equilibrium.
Relocating Design Activities to Lower Costs
We now take a closer look at the offshoring of chip design to reduce costs. All parts of chip design and development, from specification to finished chips, can be done by different teams, either in-house or outsourced, and either locally or offshore. First let us look at moving in-house design activities to areas with lower salaries, and then turn to outsourcing activities, both at home and abroad.
For Silicon Valley firms, some cost reduction is available by opening satellite design centers elsewhere in the U.S., where some locations have average engineering salaries that are up to 20% lower than salaries in the Silicon Valley. But these salaries are still much higher than salaries in India and elsewhere. 13 The prospects for cost reduction offshore have become much more feasible with the availability of the global high-bandwidth infrastructure and the economic liberalization of large economic areas in Eastern Europe, and especially Asia.
14 Dividing chip designs across locations presents a number of managerial challenges.
The sacrifice of face-to-face interaction between different parts of the design team can adversely affect productivity, and distance makes it harder to evaluate and reward individual contributions to team performance. Task assignments must be more carefully codified for offshore teams than for locally-based engineers, and managers will need to travel periodically between locations. When the separation is across borders, there are also cultural differences that can make communication less effective. A high-level manager at a design center of a U.S. multinational in Bangalore told us about communication problems between teams in India and the U.S., especially when projects were initially being developed. A major cultural difference was the Indian engineers' reluctance to disagree with their superiors or to speak up with suggestions for improvements since this might appear to be critical of others. Indian engineers would agree to proposed timelines even when they could not be met, since saying that the time was too short indicated the engineers were not up to the task. 15 Cost-driven in-house offshoring incurs other costs that partially offset the difference in salaries, especially during the early stages of establishing an offshore design center. One that is often mentioned, and one observed in our fieldwork, is the lower quality and productivity of inexperienced engineers. This raises monitoring costs, and offshore engineers may also require a longer training period than a U.S. team would need. Additional controls may also be needed to protect key intellectual property.
According to a venture capitalist, the actual savings from going offshore is more likely to be 25 to 50% rather than the 80 to 90% suggested by a simple salary comparison. 16 Design offshoring can run up against national security barriers. For example, the U.S. government has placed limits on the export of advanced encryption technology.
Communications chips that employ such technology are difficult to design offshore.
Either the chip design must be compartmentalized, with the encryption block designed only in the United States, or government approval, subject to possible delays, must be obtained in advance. 17 Yet despite these pitfalls, the amount of offshore design in industrializing economies has noticeably expanded in recent years, especially in India (Bangalore in particular). Among the top twenty U.S. semiconductor companies, only two have not established a design center in India (see Table 3 ). Nine of these companies opened their The training curve for domestically-educated engineers can be steep. In one instance we studied, a chip design project took twice as long to complete as planned. 18 The range of activities is quite broad, and can include simple parts of the design flow of a mature technology or can include the entire design flow as at TI.
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In a marked difference with India, multinational companies have opened far fewer design centers in China. Concerns over intellectual property protection appear to pose a greater barrier to foreign design activity there than in India. 19 Table 4 PortalPlayer, the company behind the key multimedia chip in Apple's iPod, is a recent example of a successful start-up that set up an Indian software and chip design subsidiary within a few months of its founding in 1999. 24 Low-cost design engineering resources can also be tapped through international outsourcing, although to date most design outsourcing by U.S. companies takes place domestically. Many interviewees reported that they outsource physical design to small local companies on an as-needed basis. The leading suppliers of design services worldwide are the leading design automation software vendors, Cadence Design Systems, Synopsys, and Mentor Graphics. Their annual services revenue is about $300 million out of a total outsourced design market estimated at $2.5 billion. 25 As this suggests, the remaining market is highly fragmented.
The availability of outsourcing (foreign or domestic) is particularly important for small companies and start-ups because of the relatively large fixed cost of EDA tools, which are typically licensed per engineer. One consultant estimated that the minimum annual software expense for a small company is $10 million. 26 For the industry as a whole, EDA expense runs close to 1% of revenue. In that case, a company earning less than $1 billion in revenue would be below the efficient scale for in-house design. Only the nine largest fabless companies met that criterion in 2004. One consultant estimated ITEC Working Paper 08-07 that outsourcing even within the United States would save a small start-up that does fewer than five designs a year up to two-thirds the cost of doing the work in-house. 27 Another type of customer for outsourced design services are the systems companies, such as Apple Computer or Cisco. Although these companies often design chips in-house either to protect intellectual property or to reduce the cost of custom chips, they may turn to outside (and possibly offshore) service providers for part of the design process.
Engineer Capabilities across Countries
In order to assess the semiconductor capabilities of companies across countries, we look in more detail at the availability, quality (education and skills), and cost of chip engineers, which largely determines the technology capability of the companies.
A major problem with comparing semiconductor engineering talent across countries is that the engineers in China and India, and to a lesser extent Taiwan, are younger with less experience and less education than the engineers in the U.S. and Japan.
In India and China, technicians with a two-year degree are often classified as engineers, and this is not usually the case in the U.S. and Japan. We see a similar process occurring in China and India, and in many ways we think that Taiwan provides us with a benchmark of how semiconductor engineering will develop in India and China as the semiconductor industry matures, with the important difference that Taiwan is a much smaller country. In India and China, the industry is still quite young in design, in which both countries are active, and in fabrication, which is not yet occurring in India. Subsidiaries of multinational companies (MNCs) are playing a major role in the development of the semiconductor industry in India. In China, domestic companies, often with personnel and funds from Taiwan and government subsidies, are playing a major role in semiconductor design. In China's fabrication sector, both MNCs and domestic companies (again with government subsidies and labor and capital from Taiwan) are playing a major role in semiconductor fabrication in China.
Overview of engineering in Asia. With the caveat that comparing semiconductor engineering talent in the U.S., Japan, Taiwan, China and India means comparing engineers with different education and experience, we present rough estimates for engineer salaries in Table 2 , which is based on a combination of published sources and interviews.
We also include the value of fabs constructed, the number of active chip designers (excluding embedded software), and an index of intellectual property protection for these countries. IP protection is an important consideration in deciding what engineering activities to undertake in other countries. Table   6 ). Fifty-three of the top one hundred universities are located in the U.S. and five are in Japan. In the top five hundred universities, 168 are in the U.S., 34 are in Japan, and only 21 are in China, Taiwan, and India combined. China. 35 Although the lifetime return rates for engineers is not known, at the time of graduation 80 to 85% of noncitizen PhD graduates planned on remaining in the U.S. to work. 36 However only 60% of the noncitizen graduates, compared to 70% of citizen graduates, had made plans, and this indicates that perhaps many were having trouble acquiring a visa required to work in the U.S.
If we look at engineer BS graduation rates by country, we see that China and India produce many engineers with a BS degree, but that most of them graduate from lowranked colleges ( One measure of the capability of semiconductor design engineers, both in the universities and in companies, is the submission of papers to the International Solid-ITEC Working Paper 08-07
State Circuits Conference (ISSCC), which is IEEE's global forum for presentation of advances in chip design (see Figure 1 ). This measure indicates that design capability in Asian countries has been improving. Over the 2001 to 2006 period, submissions from China, India, and especially Taiwan increased noticeably, as did the submissions from the U.S. As the conference's overall acceptance rate fell from 53% to 38%, Taiwan's total acceptances rose even as the rejection rate for Taiwan (and the U.S.) rose. We expect that acceptances from India and China will increase in the near future as the quality of their university engineering programs improves. 
Semiconductor Industry Profiles in Taiwan, China, and India
Let us look in more detail at the evolution of the semiconductor industry and the technology capability in Taiwan, India, and China and how it compares to the U.S. and Japan.
Of the three Asian countries, Taiwan has the most developed semiconductor industry. According to Taiwan's Ministry of Economic Affairs, Taiwan ranked third (behind the U.S. and Japan) in semiconductor-related patent grants from the U.S. 42 Taiwanese firms' reliance on sales to local systems firms is based on their specializing in cost-down, fast-follower capabilities. From a U.S. perspective, Taiwanese competition has shortened the market window during which U.S. chip companies can recoup their investments in new chips before similar products appear at a lower price.
PTO
Taiwan's design teams were praised in our interviews for their execution, which is a vital trait in an industry where time-to-market is often the difference between profit and loss. A frequent criticism we heard was that they are not yet truly innovative.
Ironically, they are locked in as technology followers to some extent by their reliance on business from the local systems firms, who are themselves as much as a generation behind the leading-edge technology. Apart from SMIC, China's foundries have adopted modest growth plans, especially compared to the headline-grabbing predictions of a few years ago. 50 But there is no question that chip fabrication is firmly established in China and will gradually expand.
Although China's fabs pose a growing low-cost challenge to the Taiwan foundries, from the perspective of U.S. chip firms they add welcome competition to the market for wafer processing.
Unlike India, most chip design in China takes place in local firms. Local chip design is at an early stage, but the most successful firms, all of whom have adopted the fabless model, are progressing rapidly. China's top 10 chip design firms in 2006 (Table   9 ) had total revenue of $1.96 billion, up from $1.25 billion the year before. 51 This is a fraction of chip consumption in China, which became the largest market of any region for chip consumption in 2005 with internal purchases of $40.8 billion. 52 The largest of China's fabless firms is Hong Kong-based Solomon Systech, which specializes in driver chips for low-end displays. The company, which was spun out from Motorola in 1999, has seen its revenue decline in recent years.
The second-and fourth-largest firms (Actions, media In terms of process technology, which is one measure of sophistication, most
Chinese chip design is still a generation or two behind fabless companies in the rest of the world. In 2006, 0.25-micron and 0.18-micron were considered mainstream, with a ITEC Working Paper 08-07 few companies reaching 0.13-micron. 53 Elsewhere, the 0.09-micron generation was considered mainstream, and the leading edge had moved to 0.065-micron. 54 The most advanced chip design by Chinese companies is being done by the design divisions of some of the local systems firms (most of which are not counted as fabless design companies) and a few world-class start-ups headed by U.S. returnees. The large and growing domestic market created by the local system firms provides the opportunity for China's chip design companies to grow and become profitable, especially since market entry by foreign firms is constrained by the government. In the future, local design firms may be able to use their expertise and revenues gained from the large local market to design products for the global marketplace.
The Chinese government has taken many steps in support of chip design firms, some of the largest of whom are state-owned. Measures include tax reductions, venture investing, incubators in seven major cities, and special government projects. 55 A valueadded tax preference for domestically-designed chips was phased out under U.S.
pressure, and will reportedly be replaced by a WTO-friendly R&D fund, although it has not been announced as of this writing (September 2006).
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The return of Chinese nationals with education and work experience has been an important part of China's recent technology development. 57 The returnees provide valuable management experience and connectivity to global networks that tend to accelerate the pace at which China's chip sector can develop. 58 The government maintains statistics on student returnees. In 2003, it was reported that, of 580,000 students that had gone abroad since 1978, one-quarter (or 150,000) had returned.
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These returnees had started 5,000 businesses, including over 2,000 IT companies in Beijing's Zhongguancun Science Park (one-sixth the park total). 60 China is working to attract more high-tech returnees with a range of specially-targeted incentives and infrastructure. 61 One factor that favors the development of local design companies is that engineers prefer to work for domestic start-ups and domestic companies rather than MNCsvirtually the opposite of what interviews revealed in india. Many young Chinese engineers, especially returnees, want to take the risk working for an emerging company that may result in great wealth.
India presents a very different picture than China in the semiconductor industry.
India faces benign neglect by the government, a lack of manufacturing for chips and systems, and weaker levels of brain circulation with its U.S.-based expatriates. 62 Unlike
Taiwan and China, India has no high-volume chip manufacturing, although as many as five proposals to build a foundry are in various stages of negotiation. 63 India is estimated to have 120 chip design firms, and its chip design revenue in 2005 is estimated to be $583 million. 64 engineers, whose personal motivation is often given as helping India develop rather accumulating personal wealth.
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The U.S. MNCs are highly dependent upon returnees with advanced degrees from the U.S. to develop new projects in India, since most domestically-trained engineers lack the knowledge of the technology being transferred, lack the management skills required, and also lack knowledge of the entire product cycle. Foreign subsidiaries are facing formidable problems in their operations in India, including a very tight labor market and inadequate infrastructure in transportation, communications, and housing.
As in China, the quality of engineering graduates is highly variable. This is exacerbated in India by the fact that most engineers want to study computer science rather than electronics, and many are not aware of the job opportunities in semiconductors.
Graduate education in EE is in its infancy, and doctoral education in the seven major technical universities is not up to U.S. standards. The very low wages paid to professors, the lack of expensive and ever-changing EDA tools, and the difficulty and expense in getting engineering chips fabricated, partly explain the problems in developing worldclass graduate education. In addition, India has not attracted returnees to the extent that China has, and so the flow of returnees with graduate degrees is low. The low flow of new domestic graduates and returnees into the EE labor supply, coupled with the need for at least three to five years of experience to be a fully-productive chip designer, has prevented the supply of design engineers from keeping up with the fast-growing demand.
As a result, wages for chip designers have been rising rapidly, both at entry level and during the first five years (and beyond). As mentioned above, salaries after five years of experience are double the entry-level salary.
Inadequate infrastructure, especially in Bangalore, also imposes serious problems for chip design centers. The lack of a stable energy supply and lack of office space means that foreign subsidiaries must make substantial investments to provide both offices and reliable electricity. The small, pothole-filled roads are gridlocked in Bangalore, the country's primary city for high-tech, and employees spend long hours in commuting from affordable housing. In addition, high-tech companies are spread out over the city, and commuting between companies, or even between company locations, However the talent shortages still remain, especially for experienced engineers with advanced degrees.
The Outlook for the Semiconductor Industry by Country
Overall the U.S. semiconductor industry has benefited from globalization, which has allowed companies to lower costs by moving operations or subcontracting. In turn, the lower costs have allowed U.S. multinationals to expand the market for their products and to compete with foreign companies that are more efficient or face lower domestic costs or receive government subsidies. U.S. chip industry has also benefited from a large talent pool, which is primarily produced by U.S. world-class universities, and by the U.S. However danger signs point to problems that the chip industry and its workers may face in the near term. A major challenge for the U.S. is the state of the domestic economy, which has relied on foreign countries and foreigners to provide savings to pay for public and private debts, which were compounded by the housing mortgage crisis.
Over time a low domestic savings rate puts upward pressure on interest rates, which lowers private investment and weakens economic growth.
At the same time, U.S. companies must expand in the rapidly growing markets in Asia. Fortunately a realignment of the U.S. dollar with foreign currencies is helpful in making U.S. companies more competitive abroad, but this by itself is not adequate develop products for customers in developing markets, who have different needs and values than U.S. consumers.
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A potential problem for the U.S. is its dependence on foreign students for graduate training in U.S. universities, since after graduation these engineers may become increasingly mobile across the globe. If so, U.S. companies may find their access to top talent becomes more unreliable. The lack of integration of immigration policy with higher education policy impedes the ability for the government, universities, and companies to find acceptable solutions that will ensure a steady supply of the besttrained engineers to domestic companies. Foreign graduates of U.S. universities find that they must qualify for a temporary visa (usually H-1B visa) through an employer in order to work in the U.S. after earning a Masters or PhD. However their visa problems do not end there, since the H-1B allows them to work for their employer for up to six years (with one renewal). If the H-1B visa holders have not been able to obtain permanent residency (a "green card"), which now takes more than five years to obtain, these highly educated and skilled workers are forced to return to their home countries.
Hidden discrimination against ethnic groups, who hit glass ceilings in many large U.S. companies, has also pushed many of them back to their home countries, where their opportunity to start new companies, especially in China, or to work for multinational companies, especially in India, provides them with superior careers over the alternative of stagnation in middle management in the U.S. Others may strike out as entrepreneurs in the United States, where they have succeeded. 70 We expect the proportion of foreign engineers who return home after being educated and working in the U.S. to grow, and the U.S. may face a brain drain with its current higher education and immigration policies.
Japanese semiconductor companies have been slower to take advantage of locating activities in lower cost regions in Asia, even though areas are closer to home. This reflects the Japanese preference for keeping manufacturing operation (and jobs) in Japan.
This also reflects language barriers in India and China, where English is more likely to be spoken than Japanese as well as cultural barriers in China, where Japanese actions during World War II still cause bitter memories. Japanese electronics companies had relied far too long on their large (but relative shrinking) domestic market, while companies in other countries were expanding their sales abroad. Reliance on the Japanese market became a problem especially during the "lost decade" of the 1990s when Japan suffered slow or negative growth.
In the 2000s, Japanese companies began in earnest to set up manufacturing and assembly operations in China and Taiwan, both to take advantage of the lower costs and to develop a presence in the large rapidly growing market. Established Japanese electronics companies, which had high status in hiring and product promotion in Japan as long as the companies were doing well, continued to rely primarily upon internal R&D for innovation, although Japan's multinational electronics companies relied upon alliances and networks to push ahead in the innovation process as costs and risks increased. Large Japanese companies presented a barrier to entrepreneurs who wanted to found start-ups to develop new technology, since the large companies would not purchase products from new companies and so start-ups could not break into the domestic market.
Japan's isolation extended to the university system, which draws largely from a domestic population, which tends to do both undergraduate and graduate training at home. Partly because of language barriers and partly because of preferences, Japan has remained on the periphery of the brain circulation of professional workers that has been a vital part of the start-up and innovation process in the U.S.
Japan's economic upturn has returned the semiconductor and electronics companies to profitability and provides them with new opportunities to expand into new product market both at home and abroad. Unfortunately, their expanded investment has been disproportionately to build new 300mm fabs, which have generally been operating at throughputs that do not take advantage of economies of scale (the main except being Toshiba). However Japanese expansion of manufacturing operations in China, and more recently design operations in India, indicates that Japan may finally be able to take advantage of the rapid growth of both regional talent and product markets. We believe that Japan's future depends upon her ability to play a key role in the integration and development of regional markets. In our fieldwork, we observed more willingness by younger Japanese to travel and work in China and Taiwan, as well as to have colleagues from those countries work in Japan. The overlap of written Chinese and Japanese presents less of a barrier than the spoken language, and younger Japanese seem more open to learning Chinese.
Taiwan's success in building the foundry business and an electronics component industry over the past three decades, is envied by emerging Asian rivals. The role of the government, which set up effective research centers and spawned new companies, and of returnees, who were educated and then worked in the U.S., were critical in the early stages of Taiwan's industrial development. Taiwan's development rested upon a wellexecuted fast follower model that competed on cost and drew on the country's welltrained technical workers, government-subsidized R&D, and large number of original equipment manufacturers (OEMs). As we saw, however, Taiwan's challenge is to move well as funding, and requires establishing new linkages between the university and company R&D programs. We think that the universities must, and will, play a vital role in the future innovation process in Taiwan, and that Taiwan will continue to draw on its synergy with China, where Taiwan supplies expertise and high-end design and technology to Chinese companies, who help develop products and manufacture them.
However China poses a potential threat to Taiwan, both as a "fast follower" competitor and as low-cost foundry competitor. Taiwanese companies must continue to move to higher-end design and manufacturing activities as it benefits from using China for lower-end lower-cost activities.
China and India present an interesting contrast in their approaches to development in high-tech industries. India has developed expertise that primarily complements the activities of developed countries, especially the U.S. We saw this in India's development of design centers that primarily undertook lower-end activities in the design flow or updated legacy designs. China has undertaken a more ambitious route of supporting start-ups that would compete directly with semiconductor companies globally, and of developing a foundry business that would compete with established foundries, especially in Taiwan global markets remains to be seen. These two countries will play an increasingly important role in high-tech industries, both as markets and suppliers. Although neither country will overtake the U.S. in the semiconductor industry in the near future, their long-run challenge U.S. semiconductor leadership remains to be seen.
